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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Jeffrey Dane Murray appeals from the district court's order dismissing his 
petition for post-conviction relief after an evidentiary hearing. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of The Underlying Criminal Proceedings 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Murray pled guilty to one count of felony 
domestic violence 1 and the state agreed to limit its sentencing recommendation 
to a suspended sentence of ten years, with three years fixed, and to allow Murray 
to argue for a lesser sentence. (See R., p.3; see generally Exhibit 2.) The 
agreement also required Murray to get a domestic violence and alcohol 
evaluation. (Exhibit 2, p.?, Ls.?-8.) After the parties placed the terms of the 
agreement on the record, the following discussion occurred: 
THE COURT: Okay, is there an Estrada[2J waiver? 
[PROSECUTOR]: I believe so. 
THE COURT: Well, I think there would have to be. I'm not going to 
take it without an Estrada waiver. 
[DEFE;NSE COUNSEL]: Just a moment, let me talk to the 
prosecutor. 
(Brief delay.) 
1 The state originally charged Murray with attempted strangulation, which carries 
a maximum penalty of 15 years, I.C. § 18-923, and misdemeanor battery. (R., 
p.94.) The plea agreement allowed Murray to plead guilty to a single amended 
charge of felony domestic violence, which carries a maximum penalty of 10 years 
for a first offense, I.C. § 18-918. (R., p.94.) 
2 Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 149 P.3d 833 (2006). 
1 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes, that's fine. He will waive, Your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Is that you want to do, Mr. Murray? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am. 
THE COURT: Is there anything else you are expecting I didn't hear 
about? 
THE DEFENDANT: No, ma'am. 
THE COURT: Okay. And so you do want to plead guilty under 
these terms today? 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes, ma'am. 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am. 
(Exhibit 2, p.?, L.25 - p.8, L.20.) 
The court also later inquired, during Murray's plea colloquy, whether 
Murray understood he was "giving up [his] rights under State versus Estrada," 
which meant that he could not "refuse to answer any question or provide any 
information that might tend to show [he committed] some other crime," and that 
he would need to "talk freely and openly with the presentence investigator and 
with any domestic violence evaluator about any problems that [he] might have 
that might have a bearing upon sentencing." (Exhibit 2, p.16, L.22 - p.17, L.6.) 
Murray responded, "Yes, ma'am," and reiterated that response when the court 
affirmed whether he was "aware of that." (Exhibit 2, p.17, Ls.7-9.3) 
3 Paragraph 2 of the guilty plea questionnaire, which Murray initialed prior to 
entering his guilty plea, also addressed the nature of an Estrada waiver. (Exhibit 
1.) Paragraph 2 reads: 
The waiver of your right to remain silent only applies to your plea of 
guilty to the crime(s) in this case unless you are waiving your rights 
2 
Consistent with the terms of the plea agreement, the court ordered Murray 
to obtain a domestic violence evaluation and an alcohol evaluation. (Tr., p.21, 
Ls.10-22.) The domestic violence evaluator completed an evaluation, which was 
submitted to the court. (Exhibit 3.) Based on the information provided to the 
court at sentencing, including the domestic violence evaluation, the court 
imposed a unified ten-year sentence with three years fixed, but declined to follow 
the state's recommendation to suspend the sentence in lieu of 120 days in jail. 
(Exhibit 2, pp.31-37.) 
Although Murray reserved his right to appeal his sentence, he did not do 
so. (R., ppA, 33; Exhibit 2, p.17, L.24 - p.18, L.10.) Murray did, however, file a 
Rule 35 motion and filed a notice of appeal timely only from the denial of that 
motion. (See R., pA.) The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of Rule 35 relief 
on the ground that Murray failed to support his motion with new or additional 
information not considered at the time of sentencing. State v. Murray, Docket 
No. 37482, 2010 Unpublished Opinion No. 693 (Idaho App. Nov. 1, 2010). 
Course Of Post-Conviction Proceedings 
While is Rule 35 appeal was pending, Murray, through counsel, filed a 
petition for post-conviction relief. (R., pp.3-12.) In his petition, Murray alleged (1) 
under State v. Estrada. Unless you waive your rights under 
Estrada, even after pleading guilty, you will still have the right to 
refuse to answer any question or to provide any information that 
might tend to show you committed some other crime(s). You can 
also refuse to answer or provide any information that might tend to 
increase the punishment for the crime(s) to which you are pleading 
guilty. 
(Exhibit 1, p.1.) 
3 
his guilty plea was invalid because he was "not aware at the time [he] entered the 
guilty plea that the Court did not have to follow the terms of the plea agreement" 
even though he signed a guilty plea questionnaire advising him of such (R., pp.4-
5); (2) ineffective assistance of counsel at the change of plea hearing based on 
counsel's failure to explain to Murray what it meant to waive his rights under 
Estrada and counsel's failure to obtain a "confidential domestic violence 
evaluation prior to entering a plea of guilty" (R., pp.6-7); (3) ineffective assistance 
of counsel at sentencing for failing to discuss the domestic violence evaluation 
with Murray prior to sentencing or "take any actions to try to correct those factual 
misunderstandings in the court-ordered evaluations," and for failing to seek a 
continuance of the sentencing to allow more time to discuss the presentence 
investigation ("PSI") and attempt to "disprove" "false statements" contained in the 
PSI (R., pp.6-9); (4) ineffective assistance of counsel "post-sentencing" for failing 
to advise Murray of his ability to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea and a 
notice of appeal4 (R., pp.9-10); and (5) ineffective assistance of counsel for 
failing to advise Murray that he "could obtain another evaluation in order to rebut 
the findings in the court-ordered evaluation and support [his] Rule 35 motion" (R., 
pp.10-11). 
Murray's post-conviction case ultimately proceeded to an evidentiary 
hearing after which the district court issued a Decision denying Murray's request 
4 This ineffective assistance of counsel claim was alleged against two attorneys -
the attorney that represented Murray through sentencing and a different attorney 
who appeared as Murray's counsel "nine days after the judgment and sentence 
was filed." (R., pp.9-11.) The only claims raised on appeal relate to Murray's 
original trial counsel who represented him through sentencing. 
4 
for post-conviction relief. (See generally Tr.; R., pp.93-112.) Murray filed a 
timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.114-117.) 
5 
ISSUE 
Murray states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err when it dismissed Mr. Murray's petition for 
post-conviction relief? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.4.) 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 




Murray Has Failed To Establish The District Court Erred In Denying Relief On His 
Claim That Counsel Was Ineffective In Advising Him Of His Rights In Relation To 
The Domestic Violence Evaluation 
A. Introduction 
Murray contends the district court erred in denying relief on his claim that 
counsel was ineffective "for failing to discuss with him his rights under Estrada v. 
State, 143 Idaho 558 (2006), and advise him as to whether he should waive 
those rights before he entered a plea of guilty and participated in a court-ordered 
domestic evaluation." (Appellant's Brief, p.5.) Murray further asserts error in the 
denial of relief on his related claim that counsel was ineffective "for failing to 
advise him that he could obtain a confidential domestic violence evaluation prior 
to pleading guilty." (Appellant's Brief, p.5.) A review of the evidence presented 
at the post-conviction hearing and the applicable legal standards supports the 
district court's conclusion that Murray is not entitled to relief on these claims. 
B. Standard Of Review 
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel presents mixed questions of 
law and fact. A petitioner for post-conviction relief has the burden of proving, by 
a preponderance of the evidence, the allegations on which her claim is based. 
Idaho Criminal Rule 57(c); Estes v. State, 111 Idaho 430,436,725 P.2d 135, 141 
(1986). A trial court's decision that the petitioner has not met his burden of proof 
is entitled to great weight. Sanders v. State, 117 Idaho 939, 940, 792 P.2d 964, 
965 (Ct. App. 1990). Further, the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be 
7 
given to the testimony are matters within the discretion of the trial court. Rueth v. 
State, 103 Idaho 74,644 P.2d 1333 (1982). 
C. Murray Has Failed To Establish He Met His Burden Of Proving Counsel 
Was Ineffective In Relation To His Advice Regarding Murray's "Estrada 
Rights" And His Ability To Obtain A Confidential Evaluation 
In order to prove a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a post-
conviction petitioner must demonstrate both deficient performance and resulting 
prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); State v. 
Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129,137,774 P.2d 299, 307 (1989). An attorney's 
performance is not constitutionally deficient unless it falls below an objective 
standard of reasonableness, and there is a strong presumption that counsel's 
conduct is within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Gibson 
v. State, 110 Idaho 631,634,718 P.2d 283,286 (1986); Davis v. State, 116 
Idaho 401, 406, 775 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct. App. 1989). To establish prejudice, a 
defendant must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's deficient 
performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Aragon 
v. State, 114 Idaho 758,761,760 P.2d 1174, 1177 (1988); Cowgerv. State, 132 
Idaho 681,685,978 P.2d 241, 244 (Ct. App. 1999). The United States Supreme 
Court has recently reiterated: 
Surmounting Strickland's high bar is never an easy task. An 
ineffective-assistance claim can function as a way to escape rules 
of waiver and forfeiture and raise issues not presented at trial, and 
so the Strickland standard must be applied with scrupulous care, 
lest intrusive post-trial inquiry threaten the integrity of the very 
adversary process the right to counsel is meant to serve. 
8 
Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 788 (2011) (citations and quotations 
omitted). 
Murray contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel in relation 
to the court-ordered domestic violence evaluation. (Appellant's Brief, pp.5-17.) 
The district court correctly concluded Murray is not entitled to relief on this claim. 
In Estrada, the defendant participated in a court-ordered psychosexual 
evaluation after pleading guilty to rape. 143 Idaho at 560, 149 P.3d at 835. 
Estrada's attorney advised him that he needed to fully cooperate in the 
evaluation. & The evaluation of Estrada was ultimately unfavorable and was 
relied on by the district court in imposing a life sentence with 25 years fixed. & 
Estrada subsequently filed a post-conviction petition contending his attorney was 
deficient for failing to advise him that he was not required to participate in the 
evaluation and that he was prejudiced as a result because, without the 
evaluation, he would have received a more favorable sentence. & The district 
court denied relief and Estrada appealed. & at 561, 149 P.3d at 836. 
On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court held Estrada's attorney was deficient 
in "failing to inform Estrada of his right to assert the privilege against self-
incrimination," which right it found applied to the psychosexual evaluation. 
Estrada, 143 Idaho at 564, 149 P.3d at 839. The Court also held Estrada met his 
burden of demonstrating prejudice because the "sentencing judge's specific, 
repeated references to the psychosexual evaluation suggest that it did play an 
important role in the sentencing." & at 565, 149 P.3d at 840. 
9 
Relying on Estrada, Murray alleged in his post-conviction petition that his 
attorney was deficient for failing to advise him what it meant to waive his rights 
under Estrada. (R., p.6.) Although trial counsel testified that he "[p]robably didn't 
fully explain [the Estrada] rights in detail" (Tr., p.11 0, Ls.12-19), and he "may not 
have" explained to Murray that he was waiving his right against self-incrimination 
(Tr., p.111, Ls.1-7), the district court ultimately concluded this deficiency did not 
entitle Murray to relief because the court itself advised Murray of the nature of the 
rights he was waiving under Estrada (R., p.107). Specifically, the court cited the 
Estrada language from the guilty plea questionnaire, which Murray initialed. (R., 
p.107.) The court also discussed the waiver with Murray during his plea 
colloquy. (Exhibit 2, p.16, L.22 - p.17, L.6.) As noted by the district court, under 
Gonzales v. State, 151 Idaho 168, 254 P.3d 69 (Ct. App. 2011), the information it 
provided to Murray regarding his waiver satisfied the requirements of Estrada. 
(R., p.1 07.) 
Murray acknowledges Gonzales "[u]nquestionably . . . stands for the 
principle cited by the district court." (Appellant's Brief, p.10.) Nevertheless, 
Murray "maintains that Gonzales was incorrectly decided by the Idaho Court of 
Appeals, especially in light of the principles set forth by the Supreme Court in 
Estrada and State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88 (1998)." (Appellant's Brief, p.10.) 
Murray also argues his "case can be distinguished from those [sic] in Gonzales." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.1 0.) Murray's arguments fail. 
Idaho jurisprudence requires respect for its own precedent. The rule of 
stare decisis dictates that controlling precedent be followed "unless it is 
10 
manifestly wrong, unless it has proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or unless 
overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy 
continued injustice." State v. Dana, 137 Idaho 6, 9, 43 P.3d 765, 768 (2002); 
State v. Humphreys, 134 Idaho 657, 660, 8 P.3d 652, 655 (2000) (quoting 
Houghland Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72, 77, 803 P.2d 978, 983 (1990)); 
see also State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 1001, 842 P.2d 660, 680 (1992) 
("[P]rior decisions of this Court should govern unless they are manifestly wrong 
or have proven over time to be unjust or unwise."); State v. Odiaga, 125 Idaho 
384, 388, 871 P.2d 801, 805 (1994) ("Having previously decided this question, 
and being presented with no new basis upon which to consider the issue, [the 
Court is] guided by the principle of stare decisis to adhere to the law as 
expressed in [its] earlier opinions."); State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425, 440-52, 825 
P.2d 1081, 1096-1108 (1991) (McDevitt, J., specially concurring). Murray has 
failed to meet his burden of showing Gonzales should be overruled. 
Murray contends Gonzales was wrongly decided because the Court in that 
case failed to recognize that defense counsel must provide advice regarding 
whether to assert the right not to participate in the evaluation. (Appellant's Brief, 
p.12.) According to Murray, 
To hold that a district court's statements concerning a 
defendant's Estrada rights are the functional equivalent of an 
attorney's advice on the subject, as the Court of Appeals did in 
Gonzales and the district court did in this case, makes too little of 
the requirement that defense counsel 'advise' a defendant with 
respect to whether to submit to a potentially-incriminating 
evaluation. 
(Appellant's Brief, p.12.) 
11 
Murray's argument ignores the crux of his own claim. In his petition, 
Murray asserted that he was never advised "what rights [he] had under 'State v. 
Estrada.'" (R., p.6.) His argument on appeal and his complaint about Gonzales, 
however, focuses on counsel's role in advising whether to participate in such an 
evaluation. As to whether Murray was adequately advised of what his Estrada 
rights were, the Court in Gonzales was precisely right: "While it is preferable for 
counsel to advise a defendant of his right to remain silent and to discuss the 
consequences of submitting to the evaluation, counsel may not be deficient for 
failing to readvise the defendant once the sentencing court has done so." 
Gonzales, 151 Idaho at 173, 254 P.3d at 74. 
Murray's claim that Gonzales is not applicable because it is 
"distinguishable" also lacks merit. (Appellant's Brief, p.13.) Murray argues: 
Unlike the facts of Gonzales, here the district court provided 
conflicting statements concerning Mr. Murray's Estrada rights, 
specifically stating in the guilty plea questionnaire that, by pleading 
guilty, Mr. Murray was retaining his Estrada rights (Plaintiff's 
Exghibit 1, p.1), while at the plea colloquy, stating, 
And you understand you are giving up your rights 
under State versus Estrada [sic], and that means that 
you cannot refuse to answer any question or provide 
any information that might tend to show you 
committed some other crime? 
You need to talk freely and openly with the 
presentence investigator and with any domestic 
violence evaluator about any problems that you might 
have that might have a bearing upon sentencing. 
(Appellant's Brief, p.13 (emphasis original) (quoting Exhibit 2, p.16, L.22 - p.17, 
L.6).) 
12 
This argument is unsupported by the record. The questionnaire advised 
Murray his waiver of the right to remain silent only applied to his guilty plea 
"unless" he was waiving his rights under Estrada. (Exhibit 1, p.1.) Because it 
was clear the court required an Estrada waiver given the terms of the plea 
agreement (Exhibit 2, p.7, L.25 - p.S, L.10), which Murray knew before 
completing the questionnaire and engaging in his plea colloquy (Exhibit 2, p.9, 
L.11 - p.21, L.4), his claim that Gonzales does not apply because he was 
"provided conflicting statements concerning [his] Estrada rights" is meritless. 
Murray further asserts, "Aside from the fact that the two pieces of 
information provided by the district court contradict each other, the latter 
statement was incorrect." (Appellant's Brief, p.13.) Murray's contention that "the 
latter statement was incorrect" is premised upon the assertion that he could have 
"reasserted his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination at any time 
prior to, or during, the evaluation" in violation of the plea agreement. (Appellant's 
Brief, p.13.) Murray's acknowledgement that he could have breached the plea 
agreement by failing to comply with one of its terms does not make the court's 
statements about the meaning of his waiver incorrect. Moreover, Murray cites no 
authority for the proposition that a proper advisement regarding a Fifth 
Amendment waiver, particularly in the context of a negotiated plea agreement, 
must include advice on the practical ability to ignore the waiver and breach the 
agreement. 
To the extent Murray is also claiming counsel's advice to cooperate in the 
evaluation was deficient, his claim fails. (Appellant's Brief, p.7.) The state's offer 
13 
was predicated, in part, on Murray's participation in and cooperation with the 
evaluation. (Exhibit 2, p.7, Ls.7-S.) That the evaluation was ultimately 
unfavorable to Murray does not mean the advice to participate in the evaluation 
in order to take advantage of the plea offer was deficient. 
Nor was Murray's trial counsel deficient in failing to obtain a confidential 
evaluation prior to advising Murray whether to plead guilty pursuant to the state's 
plea offer. In denying relief on this claim, the district court again relied on 
Gonzales. (R., p.10S.) Like Murray, Gonzales, relying on State v. Wood, 132 
Idaho SS, 967 P.2d 702 (199S), asserted his attorney was ineffective "because, 
without first obtaining a confidential evaluation, trial counsel could not have made 
an informed decision about whether to advise . . . against participating in the 
court-ordered evaluation." Gonzales, 151 Idaho at 173, 254 P.3d at 74. In 
rejecting this claim, the Court of Appeals reasoned: 
In Wood, the Idaho Supreme Court held that trial counsel 
was deficient for failing to object to the inclusion of, as part of the 
presentence report, a psychological evaluation prepared by a 
doctor appointed to assist in Wood's defense. Wood, 132 Idaho at 
97,101,967 P.2d at 711,715. The Court further held that trial 
counsel's failure to object to the doctor's testimony at sentencing 
was unreasonable. Id. at 101, 967 P.2d at 715. Wood is 
distinguishable from this case because the psychological evaluation 
in Wood had already taken place, but the report had not yet been 
written at the time of the doctor's testimony. The Court in Wood 
held that trial counsel should have objected to the doctor's 
testimony and the inclusion of the evaluation as part of the 
presentence report because trial counsel was not aware of the 
evaluation's possibly damaging contents. Id. Here, the issue is not 
the inclusion of a possibly damaging defense evaluation. Rather, 
the issue is whether counsel was deficient for failing to initiate an 
independent evaluation in the first place. As the Idaho Supreme 
Court held in Wood, once such an evaluation is conducted, trial 
counsel should be informed as to the evaluation's contents and 
object to its inclusion at sentencing should it possibly contain 
14 
incriminating information. Id. However, Wood does not stand for 
the proposition that trial counsel is ineffective for failing to arrange 
an independent evaluation which may reveal incriminating evidence 
prior to a court-ordered evaluation. 
Gonzales, 151 Idaho at 174, 254 P.3d at 75. 
The Court of Appeals further held "the obligation of counsel, recognized in 
Estrada, to advise the defendant regarding a court-ordered psychosexual 
evaluation does not extend to an obligation to first obtain a confidential defense 
evaluation to inform the decision whether to submit to a court-ordered 
evaluation." Gonzales, 151 Idaho at 174, 254 P.3d at 75. Thus, "Counsel's 
failure to arrange a defense evaluation in order to prepare for the possible 
incriminating outcome of a subsequent evaluation does not constitute deficient 
performance." 19.: Murray argues this aspect of Gonzales is not controlling 
because, he asserts, he has "put forth a different argument, namely that his 
attorney was ineffective for failing to advise him of his right to obtain a 
confidential domestic violence evaluation prior to pleading guilty." (Appellant's 
Brief, p.16 (emphasis original).) This is not a meaningful distinction because, 
under either scenario, the question is the same - whether counsel is deficient for 
failing to obtain an independent evaluation before advising his client on whether 
to participate in a court-ordered evaluation. Further, Murray's attempt to 
distinguish Gonzales by differentiating between counsel's advice in relation to his 
guilty plea and his advice in relation to sentencing evaluations highlights that the 
heart of his argument is not an Estrada violation but a claim arising under Hill v. 
Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985), and its progeny, which Murray does not cite. 
Application of the Hill standard shows no error. 
15 
"This Court applies the Strickland test when determining whether a 
defendant has received ineffective assistance of counsel during the plea 
process." Booth v. State, 151 Idaho 612, 617, 262 P.3d 255, 260 (2011) 
(citations omitted). "When a defendant alleges some deficiency in counsel's 
advice regarding a guilty plea, the defendant must demonstrate that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded 
guilty and would have insisted on going to triaL" hi. at 621, 262 P.3d at 264 
(quotations and citations omitted). "Moreover, to obtain relief on this type of 
claim, a petitioner must convince the court that a decision to reject the plea 
bargain would have been rational under the circumstances." Padilla v. Kentucky, 
130 S.Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010) (citing Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000)). 
Murray cites no authority for the proposition that counsel is deficient in 
advising a client to accept a plea offer that requires participation in a court-
ordered evaluation without first obtaining an independent evaluation, and in fact, 
Gonzales supports a contrary conclusion. A guilty plea is valid if entered 
knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently, meaning the defendant has entered his 
plea understanding the rights he is waiving and the consequences of pleading 
guilty. State v. Dopp, 124 Idaho 481, 484, 861 P.25 51, 54 (1993). Murray 
entered his guilty plea being fully advised of these rights and after being advised 
of, and agreeing to waive, his rights in relation to the court-ordered sentencing 
evaluations. (See generally Exhibit 2.) That the domestic violence evaluation 
ultimately cast Murray in an unfavorable light did not render his guilty plea invalid 
nor did it render counsel's advice in relation to that plea deficient. Murray's 
16 
assertion that had counsel advised him of his "right" to obtain a confidential 
evaluation prior to accepting the plea offer, he would have done so and he 
"would not have pled guilty and submitted to a court-ordered evaluation had he 
known that waiving his Estrada rights could have resulted in a greater sentence" 
(Appellant's Brief, p.16), not only muddles the relevant legal standard, it fails to 
satisfy it. 
As noted, Murray has the burden of showing it would have been rational 
under the circumstances to reject the plea offer. There is no evidence that the 
plea offer allowed Murray to obtain his own private evaluation first or at all. 
Rather, the offer required Murray to participate in a court-ordered evaluation that 
would be available to the court at sentencing. Absent the evaluation, there was 
no plea offer for Murray to accept or reject. Thus, it is ultimately irrelevant 
whether Murray could or would have obtained his own evaluation prior to 
entering his guilty plea. In other words, Murray's claim that he would not have 
pled guilty "had he known ahead of time that his evaluation would be so 
unfavorable" (Appellant's Brief, p.17), assumes a factual predicate that does not 
exist, i.e., that the plea offer was available to him regardless of his participation 
in the court-ordered evaluation. In addition to this flaw in Murray's argument, he 
has provided no convincing reason why he would have rejected the plea offer 
and proceeded to trial on additional charges, one of which carries a greater 
penalty (compare I.C. § 18-923 with I.C. § 18-918), and without the benefit of a 
limited sentencing recommendation from the state. Indeed, his claim that he 
would have proceeded to trial and faced a greater penalty rather than plead guilty 
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and participate in an evaluation that contributed to a "greater sentence" than the 
one he was hoping for (albeit still consistent with the state's underlying 
sentencing recommendation) seems disingenuous. 
A review of the applicable law, the record on appeal, and the underlying 
criminal record, supports the district court's conclusion that Murray failed to meet 
his burden of proving he us entitled to post-conviction relief. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
order denying Murray's petition for post-conviction relief. 
DATED this 6th day of November, 2012. 
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